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APPEAL AND ERROR-REDUCTION OF EXCESSIVE VERDICTS ox APrAL.-
In an action for wrongful death the plaintiff recovered judgment for
$20,000. The trial court overruled a motion for a new trial after the
plaintiff had agreed to a remittitur of $5,000. The appellate court found
that the excessive amount of the judgment had not been due to the in-
fluence of passion or prejudice, but, holding that the evidence would not
support a verdict of $15,000, further reduced it to $10,000. Held, on ap-
peal (three justices dissenting), that the judgment of the appellate court
be affirmed. Chester Park Realty Co. v. Schudte, 166 N. E. 186 (Ohio 1929).
The power of appellate courts to modify an excessive verdict by order-
ing a remission is recognized by judicial decision in many jurisdictions.
Fishleigh v. Detroit United Ry., 205 Mich. 145, 171 N. W. 519 (1919);
Becker Bros. v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925). In others
it is conferred by statute. ALA. CIV. CODE (1928) § 6150; FLA. GEN. LAWS
(Skillman, 1927) § 7057. And where not srecifically provided for, the
practice is often sanctioned by judicial interpretation of comprehensive
statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing appellate courts to
modify judgments. Silverglade v. Von Rohr, 107 Ohio St. 75, 140 N. E.
669 (19 23 ),; OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 6; ORE. CoNsr. art. 7, § 3c; CAL. CODES
AND GEN. LAws (Supp. 1927) § 956a. Compulsory remittitur has been
held unconstitutional in tort actions as an infringement of the plaintiff's
right to a trial by jury. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22 (1889); (1922)
35 HAnv. L. Rsv. 616; (1922) 70 U. OF PA. L. REv. 330. But where the
prevailing party is given the option of submitting to the reduction or a
new trial, the remittitur is permitted. Gila Valley Ry. v. Hall, 2132 U. S.
94, 34 Sup. Ct. 229 (1914) ; Campbell -v. Sutliff, 214 N. W. 374 (Wis. 1927) ;
(1928) 4 Wis. L. REV. 371. The conflicting character of some of the further
limitations placed on its use illustrates the lack of uniformity prevailing on
this question. Heimlich v. Tabor, 123 Wis. 5G5, 102 N. W. 10 (1905)
(allowed only where as a matter of law the damages can be computed ac-
curately from the evidence); Bishop -v. N. Y. Times, 233 N. Y. 446, 135
N. E. 845 (1922) (only where the trial has been properly conducted);
Baltimore & 0. Ry. v. Kast, 299 Fed. 419 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) (only
where the court erred in admitting or excluding evidence or instructing
the jury); Belt Ry. 'v. Charters, 123 Ill. App. 322 (1905) (only where
passion and prejudice have not swayed the jury); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT.
(1925) art. 1861 (only where bias and partiality have influenced the jury).
The standard suggested by the dissent in the instant case, that bias .and prej-
udice requiring a new trial should be inferable from the sheer exceszive-
ness of the verdict, has been adopted by only a few courts. Brch v. Bird
and Wells Lumber Co., 116 N. IV. 245 (Wis. 1908); Krcsgo v. Fader, 158
N. E. 174 (Ohio 1927). But cf. Burdict v. Missouri Re,., 123 Mo. 221,
27 S. W. 453 (1894). See Austin Scott, Civil Procedure (1920) 33 HlAnv.
L. REV. 236, 248. Generally, excessive verdicts have been cured on appeal
even in instances similar to the principal case where the trial court has
already reduced the verdict. Standard Grower. Exch. v. Martin, 80 Fla.
864, 87 So. 54 (1921). The argument against scaling down verdicts on
appeal is that the court thereby usurps the proper function of the jury.
See Silver King Mining Co. v. Kendall, 23 Ariz. 39, 48, 201 Pac. 102, 105
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(1921); Hanley v. Great 'Northern, 66 Mont. 267, 285, 213 Pac. 235, 241
(1923); SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) § 1330. In view, however, of
the present day tendency to give appellate courts more po~ver to dispose of
cases without remanding, it seems more practicable, once the defendant's
responsibility is established, to entrust to appellate courts the power to
correct excessive verdicts than to force the expense and delay of a new
trial. See Sunderland, The Scope of Judicial Review (1929) 27 MICH. L.
REv. 416; Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 971.
APPEAL AND ERROR-WHAT CUNSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR-ERRONE-
OUS ADMISSION OF PROOF OF FACT ALREADY ESTABLISHED.-The defendant
was on trial for murder. A statement by the deceased identifying the de-
fendant as his assailant was admitted as part of the res gestae. A similar
statement was admitted as a dying declaration. The defendant was con-
victed. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed, on the ground
that the dying declaration was erroneously admitted, although the state-
ment offered as res gestae was properly in evidence. Hale v. State, 16
S. W. (2d) 1068 (Tex. 1929).
A majority of jurisdictions formerly ruled that the presence of any
error in the admission of evidence in a criminal case created ipso facto
the right to a new trial. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 21. The
general tendency today, however, is to require that the error be harmful to
the defendant to entitle him to a reversal. Note L. R. A. 1918B 390;
Note (1924) 22 MICH. L. REV. 591, 592; (1924) 19 ILL. L. Rav. 467. Some
courts, by presuming any error to be prejudicial, place the burden of
showing it to be harmless upon the prosecution. Moon v. State, 161 Ark.
234, 255 S. W. 871 (1923); Booker v. State, 121 So. 3 (Ala. 1929). Others
place the burden of showing prejudice upon the defendant. State v.
Fletcher, 126 Me. 153, 136 At]. 908 (1927) ; Marron v. United States, 18 F.
(2d) 218 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927). In general, however, the admission of in-
competent evidence to prove a given fact will be considered harmless
when the same fact is fully established by competent evidence. Wolfe v.
State, 159 N. E. 545 (Ind. 1928); People v. Nelson, 222 N. W. 122 (Mich.
1929) ; see Commonwealth v. Bird, 162 N. E. 900, 902 (Mass. 1928). But
where the evidence on the fact sought to be established is almost evenly
balanced, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the defendant. Porter v.
State, 84 Fla. 552, 94 So. 680 (1922); People v. Infantino, 224 App. Div.
193, 230 N. Y. Supp. 66 (4th Dep't 1928). Where the declaration of a
deceased person has been admitted without objection, the erroneous ad-
mission of another similar statement by the same person has been held
insufficient to require a new trial. Cain v. State, 146 S. E. 340 (Ga. 1929)
(dying declaration properly admitted; similar statement erroneously ad-
mitted as part of res gestae; new trial granted on other grounds). The
instant decision might be supported on the ground that a dying declaration
will possIbly carry more weight with a jury than a statement made as part
of the res gestae, especially when consisting of a repetition' of a former
accusation.
CONDITIONAL SALES-DEFAULT BY VENDEE-MAY VENDOR WilO IAS Dis-
AFFIRMED COLLECT NOTE GIVEN AS DowN PAYMIENT.-Under a contract of
conditional sale of an auto, the plaintiff vendor received from the defendant
as a down payment a note for $127, the balance of the purchase price to
be paid in monthly installments. The contract stipulated that in case of
default all payments previously made were to be retained by the seller as
consideration for use of the car. It acknowledged the receipt of the note
as a cash payment and further provided that, in case of default, any note
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given should forthwith become due and payable. The defendant having
default, the plaintiff took possession of the car and sued on the note.
Judgment was given for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judg-
ment be reversed. Jones-Shart Motor Co. -v. Bolin, 279 Pac.*395 (Wash.
1929).
When a buyer defaults in his payments under a contract of conditional
sale, the seller may disaffirm the contract and retake the subject matter
of the sale, or affirm the agreement and sue for the entire contract price.
Jordan v. Peek, 103 Wash. 94, 173 Pac. 726 (1918). If he elects to dis-
affirm the contract, he is not entitled to recover the contract price. L X. L.
Store. Co. v. Moon, 49 Utah 262, 162 Pac. 622 (1916) ; 2 WISTON, SALES
(2d ed. 1924) § 579. And where no provision for forfeiture is made in
the contract a few jurisdictions require the seller to return to the buyer the
down payment and subsequent payments, less a reduction for deprecia-
tion. Qualitj Clothes Shop v. Keency, 57 Ind. App. 500, 106 N. E. 541
(1914),; Enterprise Distributing Corp. v. Zalkin, 154 Ga. 97, 113 S. E.
409 (1922). In a few other jurisdictions, statutes require the cellr to
resell the article and apply the proceeds of this sale towards the contract
price of the article, permitting him to bring suit for any deficiency then
remaining. Keeler v. Goodman, 296 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924). The
general rule, however, is that the seller may dispose of the article as he
wishes and may keep the initial payment and subsequent payments made
before the default. Perkins v. Grobben, 116 Mich. 172, 74 N. W. 469
(1898); EIers Music House v. Oriental Co., 69 Wash. 618, 125 Pac. 1023
(1912). In some cases, where the intention of the parties is clearly so
expressed, the courts have even gone so far as to permit a recovery not
only of the property, but also of the entire contract price. Bedard v.
C. S. Ransom, Inc., 241 Mass. 74, 134 N. E. 392 (1922). In the instant case
recovery was denied on the ground that the note was not a payment, but
merely "a pro tanto obligation evidencing so much of the agreed sale price
of the property." In so holding the court distinguished the case from
one in which the note of a third party, given by the buyer to the seller
as the down payment, was held to be a valid payment and enforceable
after defaulL Norman v. Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 158 Pac. 78 (1916).
But the provisions of the contract in the instant case seem clearly to in-
dicate that the intention of the parties was that the note should, in case
of default, be treated as a payment. The decision of the court might
therefore seem to represent a strict adherence to principle rather than an
attempt to carry out the contract as apparently contemplated by the
parties. The decision may perhaps be justified, however, on the ground
that tle court, looking behind the words in which the agreement was
stated, recognized, and in its decision compensated for, an inequality prob-
ably existing in the bargaining powers of a large corporate vendor and
an individual purchaser.
CoNmICT OF LAWS-TIMiE WHEN DIVIDENDS AcCRUE AS INCOME OF A
TESTAmENTARY TRusT.-A testator, domiciled in Connecticut, created a
trust of property including shares of stock in New York corporations. An
agreement among all interested parties, accepted by the court as inter-
pretative of the will, provided that except for $5000 annually the income
from the trust should be paid to .the testator's widow during her life.
The New York corporations declared dividends before the widow's dcath,
payable at dates subsequent to her death. The dates of closing the stock
books to determine those entitled to the dividends vere also subsequent to
her death. The Connecticut court considered the New York rule to be
that dividends vest in the shareholder at the time of declaration. In
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Connecticut, however, dividends apparently vest in the shareholder at the
date of closing the stock books. [Richter v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 Ati.
600 (1922) (semble); cf. Nutter v. Andrews, 246 Mass. 224, 142 N. E. 67
(1923).]. In an action brought to determine who was entitled to the
dividends the case was reserved for the advice of the Supreme Court.
Held, that the dividends were payable to the estate of the wido~y, on the
ground that the law of New York was controlling. Union and New Haven
Trust Co. v. Watrous, 146 Atl. 727 (Conn. 1929).
In the absence of circumstances indicating a contrary intention, the
interpretation of a will creating a trust of personal property is governed
by the law of the settler's domicil. In re Campbell's Estate, 53 Utah 487,
173 Pac. 688 (1918); CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1927)
§ 317. On the other hand, matters of internal management of corporations
are usually governed by the law of the state of incorporation. Fisher v.
Oak Life Insurance Co., 52 N. Y. Super. Ct. 179 (1885); see Hoglan 'V.
Moore, 122 So. 824, 828 (Ala. 1929) ; BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (1904)
§§ 300, 305. Thus the shareholder's right to a dividend is controlled by
the law of the state of incorporation. Berford v. New York Iran Co., 56
N. Y. Super. Ct. 236, 4 N. Y. Supp. 836 (1888); Leary v. Columbia River
and P. S. Nay. Co., 82 Fed. 775 (C. C. Wash. 1897); CONFLICT OF LAWS
RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1927) § 196. The instant court found a sanc-
tion for its result in the latter rule, regarding the question of when a
dividend from shares of stock becomes income as a question of internal
management of the corporation. This seems reasonable, for the legal effect
of a declaration of a dividend by a New York corporation should be deter-
mined by the laws of that state. It follows that where the trust res com-
prises shares of stock in corporations of different states having conflicting
rules, dividends declared prior to the life tenant's death, payable at a
date subsequent thereto, may go in part to the life tenant's estate and in
part to the remainderman. In the absence of an expressed intention by
the settler to the contrary, however, such a result is unobjectionable.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SERVICE ON NON-RESIDENT MOTORISTS-REQUIRE-
MENT OF RETURN RECEIPT.-A Connecticut statute provides for acquiring
jurisdiction over non-resident motorists by service upon the commissioner
of motor vehicles and requires that a copy of such service be sent by reg-
istered mail to the last known address of the defendant. Conn. Pub.
Acts 1925, c. 122, §. 1. The plaintiff's assignor recovered a default judg-
ment in Connecticut after serving process on the defendant, a resident of
New York, in accordance with the above statute. In a suit on the judg-
ment in New York the defendant denied the jurisdiction of the Connecticut
court. The plaintiff moved to strike the defense and for summary judg-
ment. Held, that the motion be denied, on the ground that the statute
denied due process in failing to require the plaintiff to show by a return
receipt that notice was communicated to the defendant. Freedman v. Poiricr,
134 Misc. 253, 236 N. Y. Supp. 96 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
A Massachusetts statute requiring that notice of service upon non-
resident motorists be sent to the defendant by registered mail, and that
a return receipt be appended to the writ together with the plaintiff's
affidavit of compliance with the statute, has been held constitutional. Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct." 632 (1927) ; see (1924) 34 YALE L.
J. 415. Under a similar statute it has recently been held in New York to
be immaterial that the registered letter containing a copy of the summons
is not handed to the defendant himself and that he does not personally
sign the receipt therefor. O'Tier v. Sell, 235 N. Y. Supp. 534 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1929). It is clear that the provision for mailing notice may not
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be completely omitted. Wuchter v. Pizzatti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct
259 (1927). Statutes of Wisconsin [Wis. STAT. (1927) § 85.15 (3)] and
Minnesota [MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 2684 (8)], similar to that of
Connecticut in requiring no return receipt, have been held constitutional,
even though, unlike the Connecticut statute, they do not require the mailed
notice to the defendant to be registered. State r. Belden, 193 Wis. 145,
211 N. IV. 916 (1927), rehearing denied, 214 N. W. 460 (Wis. 1927);
Jones -v. Pazton, 27 F. (2d) 364 (D. Minn. 1928); Schilling r. Odlebach,
224 N. W. 694 (Minn. 1929); (1927) 4 Wis. L. Rnv. 189. The instant
court felt that without the requirement of a return receipt there would not
be sufficient assurance that the notice had been delivered to someone at the
defendant's last known address and was thus reasonably likely to have
reached the defendant. The desirability of imposing such strict require-
ments on the plaintiff is debatable.
CORPOPATIONS-EXERCISE OF BANKING PoWEsns-DISCOUNTING.-A New
York statute provides that no non-banking corporation, unless expressly
authorized by law, shall engage in "receiving deposits, making discounts,
or issuing notes. . . . All notes . . . made or given . . . to secure the
payment of any money loaned or discounted... contrary to the provisions
of this section shall be void." N. Y. BANKiG LAW (McKinney, 1916) §
140. The plaintiff, a non-banking corporation, brought suit against the
endorsers on notes of a third party which it had discounted for them.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. Held, on appeal (two justices
dissenting), that the judgment be reversed, on the ground that the statu-
tory prohibition applies to discounting only when it is carried on in con-
nection with other banking powers. Mescrole Sccurdtics Co. v. Coaiarn,
226 App. Div. 21, 234 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1st Dep't 1929).
The General Corporation Law of New York provides that non-banhing
corporations shall not have the power of "carrying on the business of dis-
counting . . . or of engaging in any other form of banking" except as
permitted by the banking laws. N. Y. GENERAL CORPomATIoN LAW (Mc-
Kinney, 1929) § 18. Similar provisions are common in the laws of other
states. Dm-. REv. CODE (1915) § 1918. Such statutes have been construed
as prohibiting the exercise of any one of the specifically enumerated acts,
even though unaccompanied by any other banking function. Earle V.
American Sugar Refining Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 751, 71 Atl. 391 (190S) (buy-
ing bill of exchange); see Fidelity Investment Ass'n r. Emmcr-on, 235
Ill. App. 518, 524-529 (1924) (receiving deposits), rtv'd, 318 Ill. 548, 149 N.
E. 530 (1925) (on the ground that no deposits were involved) ; cf. Loqan v.
Building & Loan Ass'n, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 490, 28 S. V. 141 (1894) (statute
prohibiting "banking and discounting" held to prohibit mere discounting).
The controversy is long-standing in New York as to whether discounting is
forbidden when unassociated with other banking powers. See N. Y. Fire-
men Ins. Co. v. Ely, 2 Cow. 678 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) (opinions of Savage,
C. J., at 710, and of Sutherland, J., at 701); People v. Brew-ter, 4 Wend.
498, 499 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1830). On its face § 140 of the Banking Law
appears to do exactly this. It is entitled Prohibitions Againrt Encroach-
nents Upon Certain Powers of Banks. Discounting is a banking power,
though not by itself banking. 1 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed.
1928) §§ 2, 50. Furthermore, the use of the conjunction or after the
term making discounts suggests that the prohibition extends to the exer-
cise of any one of the specified acts. Thus the construction of the statutes
urged in the dissenting opinion in the present case seems a proper one.
Cf. N. Y. State Loan & Trust Co. v. Helmer, 77 N. Y. 64, 68-G9 (1879);
Pratt v. Short, 79 X. Y. 437 (1880). Even if suit on the notes be denied, the
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plaintiffs may be able to recover the discount price paid to the defendants
in a separate action. Pratt v. Short, supra; Utica Ins. Co. v. Kip, 8
Cow. 20 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1827). And the notes themselves would be com-
petent evidence in such an action. Utica Ins. Co. v. Bloodgood, 4 Wend.
652 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1830).
EMINENT DOMAIN-ABANDONMENT OF HIGHWAY-COMPENSATION TO OWN-
ERS OF ABUTTING LAND- The plaintiff owned a tract of land adjacent to
a public highway, a non-abutting portion of which was abandoned by the
defendant town. Access to the land over the remainder of the road still
remained, but it was necessary to use an inconvenient and circuitous route
to reach the nearest town. The plaintiff sought compensation for the in-
convenience caused him and for the general diminution in value of his land.
The trial court overruled a demurrer to the complaint. Held, on appeal,
that the judgment be reversed. Kachele v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 145
Atl. 756 (Conn. 1929).
Where compensation is sought for abandonment of a highway it is
said to be the general rule that the plaintiff's injury, to entitle him to
damages, must be "different in kind and not merely in degree" from that
of the general public. Smith v. Boston, 7 Cush. 254 (Mass. 1851). The
strict application of this rule appears to result, as in the instant case, in
refusing compensation except where the plaintiff's land abuts on the
abandoned portion of the road. Warner v. New York, N. H. and H. R. R.,
86 Conn. 561, 86 Atl. 23 (1913); of. Tomaszewski v. Palmer Bee Co., 223
Mich. 565, 194 N. W. 571 (1923) (injunction restraining obstruction of
road refused). But cf. Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103, 42 N. E. 178
(1895). Connecticut has recognized an exception to this rule where a
portion of a causeway was abandoned, cutting off access in one direction,
and the remainder, on which the land abutted, was narrowed, rendering
access very inconvenient, though not impossible. Park City Yacht Club v.
Bridgeport, 85 Conn. 366, 82 Atl. 1035 (1912). In some jurisdictions, inter-
ference with the convenience of access to the business center or to the
neighboring system of highways, regardless of abutter on the closed por-
tion, has been made a test of the existence of a cause of action. O'Brien
v. Central Iron and Steel Co., 158 Ind. 218, 63 N. E. 302 (1902); Denver
Uiion Terminal Co. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904 (1920) ; see Oler
v. Pittsburgh Ry., 184 Ind. 431, 440, 111 N. E. 619, 622 (1915); cf. High-
barger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331, 80 Pac. 633 (1905) (injunction restraining
obstruction granted) ; Great Southern Ry. v. Barclay, 178 Ala. 125, 59 So.
169 (1912) (bill to abate obstruction granted). New York, by statutory in-
terpretation, has apparently adopted the latter test. Buffalo v. Shreiber
Brewing Co., 210 App. Div. 328, 206 N. Y. Supp. 103 (4th Dep't 1924),
aff'd, 240 N. Y. 612, 148 N. E. 727 (1925); N. Y. Laws 1916, c. 576, § 12.
A few jurisdictions have granted compensation for a diminution in property
value even though convenient access remains. Re Tate, 10 Ont. L. R. 651
(1905); cf. Madden v. Pennsylvania R. R., 11 Ohio C. C. 571 41900), aIJ'd,
66 Ohio St. 649 (1902). Rejecting the rule of the principal case, equitable
relief has been granted in cases involving water highways where the injury
to the plaintiff has been greater only in degree than that of the general
public. Carver v. San Pedro Ry., 151 Fed. 334 (1906) ; cf. Union Pac. R. R.
v. Hall, 91 U. S. 343 (1875). The rule of the principal case would seem to
afford a rather harsh and perhaps unfair basis for refusing compensation to
an injured land owner. But see Comment (1927) 13 VA. L. REv. 334;
(1924) 8 MINN. L. REv. 342.
EMINENT DOMAIN,-EXCESS CONDEMNATION-CONDEMNATION FOR PUR-
POSE OF RAISING FUNDS.-The constitution of Ohio authorizes a municipality
[Vol. 39
RECENT CASE NOTES
acquiring land for a public use to condemn, in furtherance of such use, an
excess over that required by the improvement. OHIO CONST. § 10, art. 18.
The defendant city, in widening a street, undertook to condemn additional
adjacent land, the property of the plaintiffs. This excess was to be sold
at a profit and the money applied to paying for the improvement. The
plaintiffs brought suit for an injunction restraining such e.xcess con-
demnation. The lower court granted the injunction. Held, on appeal, that
the judgment be affirmed. City of Cincinnati v. Vestc;-, 33 F. (2d) 242
(C. C. A. 6th, 1929).
Several states have passed excess condemnation statutez which suggest
the possibility of condemning excess land in order to cell it at a profit and
thereby pay for an improvement. CUSHMAN, EXCESS CONDEMNATION
(1917) 218. This method has been used abroad with a varying degree of
success for many years. CUSHMAN, op. cit. supra at 143-179. The instant
case is apparently the first to arise under a constitutional provision for
excess condemnation. The constitutionality of this policy of recoupment
in the United States depends upon whether or not such use of the con-
demned land is considered to be a "public use." Fall-Broolk Irrigation Dis-
trict v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 17 Sup. Ct. 56 (1896). "Public uze" is
now broadly interpreted in many jurisdictions to mean "public benefit."
Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. 301
(1905); Connolly v. Woods, 13 Idaho 591, 92 Pac. 573 (1907). The pur-
pose of excess condemnation .when used, as in the instant case, to obtain a
profit from the excess land, is clearly to appropriate to the public the
unearned increment in value resulting from the improvement. The ac-
cepted American method of making the landowner pay for this increa!ed
value of his land is to levy special assessments on the property benefited;
but these assessments are limited to the cost of the improvements. Payne
v. Village of South Springfield, 161 Ill. 285, 44 N. E. 105 (1896); Cusu-
MAAN, op. cit. supra at 17. It is submitted that the type of excess con-
demnation exemplified by the instant case imposes no greater hardship on
the individual landowner than other types of condemnation which have
been held to be constitutional. Cf. Head v. Anmoslcay Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 9,
5 Sup. Ct. 441 (1885) (land condemned in order to erect a dam for a mill) ;
Hairston v. Danville and IV. Ry., 208 U. S. 598, 28 Sup. Ct. 331 (1903)
(land condemned in order to build spur track to a private business). It
would seem that the appropriation to the public benefit of the entire
unearned increment in the value of the land resulting from an improve-
ment made by the public might well be considered to be a "public use."
EVIDENCE-IPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES-PROOF OF PRIOn TIIuEATS To
SHow BIAS.-On a prosecution for cutting with intent to kill, the defendant
offered to show the bias of the prosecuting witnezs by testimony that the
witness had threatened the defendant's life. This testimony was excluded.
Subsequently the defendant sought to question the witness with regard to
his "hard feeling" against the defendant. Objections to such questions
were sustained. The defendant was convicted. Htid, on appeal (three
justices dissenting), that the conviction be affirmed, on the ground that,
as there was no evidence of any overt act of hostility. on the part of the
witness, evidence of his threats was inadmissible. State v. 1ilcon, 123
So. 614 (La. 1929).
It is well settled that the bias of an opposing witness may be shown either
on cross-examination or by extrinsic testimony. McGill v. CaHontotltth,
216 Ky. 430, 287 S. W. 949 (1926); Ross v. State, 275 Pac. 401 (Ola.
1929); 2 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1022. When a witness ad-
mits his hostility, some courts exclude further evidence on that subject.
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Sasser v. State, 129 Ga. 541, 59 S. E. 255 (1907); see State v. Glynn, 51
Vt. 577, 580 (1879). Contra: Lyon v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 506, 61
S. W. 125 (1901). The extent of the inquiry rests in the discretion of the
trial court. Hence details of the quarrel or other circumstances which
show hostility may be excluded. Butler v. State, 34 Ark. 480 (1879).
It would seem, however, that details sufficient to show the nature and de-
gree of the hostility should be admitted. 2 WIGMIORE, op. cit. supra § 951.
By the majority rule, a foundation for evidence of hostile declarations
must be laid by asking the witness whether he made them. Ash v. Soo
Sing Lung, 177 Cal. 356, 170 Pac. 843 (1918); State v. Grba, 196 Iowa
241, 194 N. W. 250 (1923). It lies in the court's discretion to recall a
witnes's so that the necessary foundation may be laid. Aneals v. People,
134 Ill. 401, 25 N. E. 1022 (1890). A minority rule requires no founda-
tion. People v. Michalow, 229 N. Y. 325, 128 N. E. 228 (1920); Lass v.
Lass, 52 S. D. 302, 217 N. W. 383 (1927) ; cf. Chavigny v. Hava, 125 La.
710, 51 So. 696 (1910). In a few states a foundation may or may not be
required, in the trial court's discretion. Kay v. Fredrigal, 3 Pa. 221
(1846); cf. State v. D'Adame, 84 N. J. L. 386, 86 Atl. 414 (1913). In
requiring that overt acts be shown, the court in the instant case seems
to have confused the foundation necessary for evidence of bias, with that
required for evidence of prior threats, offered to support a plea of self-
defense. See 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra § 111 (3, b).
INSURANCE--MEASURE OF RECOVERY BY SUB-LESSOR FOR Loss OF RENTS-
GROSS RENTS AS CONTRASTED WITH NET RENTS.-The plaintiff was lessee
of certain business property and sublet it at a higher rental. The premises
were rendered untenantable for five months by a fire, and under the terms
of the leases no rent was paid either by the plaintiff or by his sublessee.
In a suit brought on a policy insuring the plaintiff against "the loss of rents
caused by fire . . . actually sustained" the lower court allowed recovery
for the gross amount of rents lost without deduction for the rental the
plaintiff was relieved from paying. Held, on appeal, that the judgment
be affirmed. American Ins. Co. v. Mattox, 120 So. 912 (Ala. 1929).
It is a general principle of fire insurance law that a contract of insurance
is one of indemnity only and that to allow the insured to profit from a
fire is contrary to public policy. VANCE, INSURANCE (1st ed. 1904) 52.
So, under a policy insuring against "the loss of profits on a lease," damages
have been computed on the basis of the net rather than the gross rents.
Lite v. Firemen's In.. Co., 119 App. Div. 410, 104 N. Y. Supp. 434 (1st
Dep't 1907); O'Brien v. North River Ins. Co., 212 Fed. 102 (C. C. A. 4th,
1914) ; Note L. R. A. 1917 C 722. But cf. States Import and Export Corp.
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 210 App. Div. 374, 206 N. Y. Supp. 323 (2d Dep't
1924). And where, in a suit on a policy insuring against "loss by fire
on the rents" of a building, it appeared that the rents which the insured
was relieved from paying equalled the rents due him, it was held that
the insured could recover nothing. Moving Picture Co. of America v.
Scottish Union and National Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 358, 90 Atl. 642 (1914);
cf. Chronicle Building Co. v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 21 Ga. App.
687, 94 S. E. 1043' (1918); Carey v. London Provincial Fire In& Co., 33
Hun 315, 316 (N. Y. 1884). In certain cases, however, deviations from
the general principle have been justified on the ground that the loss to
the insured cannot be accurately determined. Thus one with less interest
than complete ownership has often been allowed to recover the full re-
placeable value of the building insured. Kludt v. German Mutual Fire
Ins. Co., 152 Wis. 637, 140 N. W. 321, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1131 (1913).
Contra: Doyle v. American Fire Ins. Co., 181 Mass. 139, 63 N. E. 394
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(1902); Rayal Exchange Assurance v. Almon, 206 Ala. 45, 89 So. 76
(1921). And where a building would have been worth considerably lezs
to a lessee because of the necessity of removing it at the expiration of the
lease shortly after the fire, he has nevertheless been held to be entitled
to its full value. Laurent v. Chat an. Fire Ins. Co., 1 Hall 41 (N. Y.
1828)-; see McClain, Insurance of Limited Interests Against Fire (1898)
11 HARv. L. REv. 512; Note (1929) 27 MII. L. REv. 683. Likewvice, in
the case upon which the instant decision chiefly relies, the court interpreted
a policy insuring against the "actual loss of rent" as providing for a
method of computing the loss on the basis of the gross rents. hitney
Estate Co. v. Northern Assurance Co., 155 Cal. b21, 101 Pac. 911 (1909),
23 L. R. A. (N. s.) 123 (1910). In the instant case, however, there would
seem to be no difficulty in determining the amount of the insured's loss.
And, at least in the absence of any showing that the plaintiff would suffer
further loss from inability to obtain new tenants, the departure from the
principle that insurance is a contract of indemnity seems unjustified.
INSURANCE-SUIT BY INJURED PERSON AGAINST LIABILITY INSUIr11-
BREACH OF CONDITION BY INSURED AS DEFE S.-The plaintiff was injured
through the negligence of a motorist protected by a policy of automobile
liability insurance. His judgment against the insured being unsatisfied,
he sued the defendant insurance company under a statute allowing such
an action where the insured himself is insolvent. LAi. RE . STAT. AN,-rn.
(Alarr, 1926) 953. A defense that the policy had been forfeited by the
failure of the insured to give notice of the accident as required by the
policy was upheld in the trial court. Held, on appeal, that the judgment
be reversed, on the ground that the breach of condition by the insured
subsequent to the accident is not available as a defense to an action by the
injured party. Edwards v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 123 So. 162 (La.
1929).
At common law an injured party cannot recover from the insurer of
a tort-feasor on the theory of a third party beneficiary contract. Haxlzbn-
v. McCalla, 95 Ga. 192, 22 S. E. 141 (1894); Bain v. Atkins. 181 Mass.
240, 63 N. E. 414 (1902); (1925) 25 COL. L. Rv. 661. But many states
have statutes permitting such an action. N. Y. INSURANCE LAW (1917)
§ 109; Conn. Pub. Acts 1919, c. 331. These statutes have been comntrued
as subrogating the injured party to the right which the insured would
have had against the insurance company had he paid the judginnt.
Lundblad v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 163 N. E. 874 (Blass. 1028);
Miller v. Met. Casualty Co., 146 Atl. 412 (R. I. 1929). Hence it has
been uniformly declared that in such an action the insurance company
may assert any defense which it could have set up against the insured,
the statutes neither enlarging nor modifying its responsibility. Lorando
v. Gethro, 228 Blass. 181, 117 N. E. 185 (1917) ; Coleman V. New Anzntcr-
dam Cas. Co., 247 N. Y. 271, 160 N. E. 367 (1928). Thus, failure by the
insured to comply with any of the conditions of the policy is generally
fatal to the injured party's cause of action. Guerin v. Indeimnity 121!. Co.,
107 Conn. 649, 142 At. 268 (1928) (failure to cobperate); Wealherwa.
v. Royal Indemnity Co., 250 N. Y. 281, 165 N. E. 293 (1929) (failure to
give notice). Notice by the injured party instead of by the insured has been
held to satisfy the formal requirement of the policy. Slavens ,. Standard
Ace. Ins. Co., 27 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928). But, as suggested in
the instant case, the injured party will rarely be in a position to know
whether the wrongdoer is insured or not. Where the terms of the policy
specifically provide that the injured party may sue, it has been held
that the policy creates a dual obligation and that the injured party's
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right can not be defeated by anything the insured may do subsequent to
its accrual. Metropolitan Gas. Ins Co. v. Albritton, 282 S. W. 187 (Ky.
1926). Contra: Merriman v. Maryland Gas. Co., 147 Wash. 543, 266 Pac.
682 (1928), overruling Finkelberg v. Continental Cas. Co., 126 Wash. 5,13,
219 Pac. 12 (1923). The decision of the instant case might be justified on the
analogy of life and fire insurance cases holding that notice by the bene-
ficiary as soon as he knows of the existence of the policy is sufficient
though the stipulated period has long since elapsed. Concordia Fire Ins.
Co. v. Waterford, 145 Ark. 420, 224 S. W. 953 (1920); Trieger v. Cam.
Travelers Mut. Ace. Assoc., 122 Misc. 159, 202 N. Y. Supp. 410 (Sup.
Ct. 1923). The instant case points to a more satisfactory tendency in
rendering the statutory right of the injured party more substantial than
under the rule heretofore declared by a majority of the courts called upon
to consider the question.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LESSOR'S OPTION TO RENEW LEASE OR PURCHASE
BUILDINGS-APPRAISAL AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ELEcTIoN.-In a
twenty-one year lease, the plaintiff lessor covenanted that at the end of
the term it would either renew the lease or pay for a building erected by
the defendant lessee, the new rental ard the value of the building to be
determined by appraisers selected four mninths before the lease should ex-
pire. Without fault of either party the appraisers failed to report by
the expiration of the term, and the lessor refused to elect until such re-
port was forthcoming. Twelve days after the end of the term, the de-
fendant served notice on the landlord that its failure to elect prior to
the end of the term operated as a renewal. The plaintiff sought a de-
claratory judgment that its option still existed and the defendant counter-
claimed for a declaration that it was entitled to a new lease. The de-
fendant had judgment on the pleadings in the lower court. Held, on appeal
(one judge dissenting), that the judgment be reversed. Trustees of Co-
lumbia University v. Kalvin, 250 N. Y. 469, 166 N. E. 169 (1929).
An express provision that appraisal shall operate as a condition pre-
cedent to the duty of the landlord to elect will be enforced. Zorkowski v.
Astor, 156 N. Y. 393 (1898). Even in the absence of such express stipu-
lation, the court may regard appraisal as a condition precedent. Hood
v. Hartshorn, 100 Mass. 117 (1868). Generally, however, the courts tend
to regard appraisal as a mere "collateral agreement." Enquist v. Mc-
Gowan, 121 Wash. 695, 209 Pac. 1091 (1922); Coles! v. Peck, 96 Ind. 333
(1884). Furthermore time is generally construed as being of the essence
of an option agr- ment. Bullock v. Grinstead, 95 Ky. 261, 24 S. W. 867
(1894). Contra: Fountain Co. v. Stein, 97 Conn. 619, 118 Atl.*47 (1922) ;
cf. (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 409. Ordinarily, where a contract provides for
an election between several alternatives, if the party with the privilege
to elect fails to do so, the privilege passes to the other party. 2 TIFFANY,
LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) 271, n. 30. The lower court applied this
doctrine to the instant case. Trustees of Columbia University v. Kalvin,
132 Misc. 601, 230 N. Y. Supp. 386 (N. Y. Co. 1928). Decisions in which
appraisal has not been construed as a condition precedent to the duty
to elect are often capable of differentiation from the instant case in that
the lessee bound himself to perform in accordance with the landlord's
choice. Coles v. Peck, supra; cf. Zorkowski v. Astor, supra. Others can
be distinguished on the ground that the appraisers were not to be ap-
pointed before the end of the term. Bullock v. Grinstead, sulyra. But in
view of the fact that leases of this nature are drawn to encourage a
tenant to improve the leased premises, the parties in the instant case
probably intended by their appraisal agreement, made twenty-one years
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ago, rather to provide for a fair evaluation of an unpredictable change
in the real estate market than to allow the lessor to gamble at the expense
of the lessee on the outcome of the appraisal and by such action tie up
property for the uncertain and possibly protracted period of arbitration.
Cf. Van Beuren v. Wotherspoon, 164 N. Y. 368, 369, 57 N. E. 633, 634
(1900) (appraisal dragged out for five years); Doyle v. Hamilton Fish
Corp., 144 App. Div. 131, 133, 128 N. Y. Supp. 898, 899 (1st Dep't 1911)
(lessee anxious for prompt action since he had sublet) ; Kaufmann v. Lig-
gett, 209 Pa. 87, 96 (1904) (uncertainty would seriously jeopardize lessee's
business). Although such a construction may seem to work an injustice on
the landlord, still the lessor can readily approximate a fair renewal rent
and the value of the tenant's building. See dissent in instant case, supra
at 475.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE-EFFECT ON
FIRST HusBAND's DUTY TO PAY ALImONY.-A divorce decree incorporating
a previous separation agreement provided that the defendant should pay
the plaintiff alimony in monthly installments "so long as she remained
unmarried." The plaintiff remarried, but after three years obtained an
annulment on the ground of fraud. Six months thereafter she brought
suit for alimony covering both the period of her second marriage and the
subsequent months. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for
judgment on the pleadings. This was reversed in the Appellate Division
and the complaint dismissed. Sleiclwr v. Slcichcr, 224 App. Div. 529, 231
N. Y. Supp. 538 (3d Dep't 1928). Held, ori appeal (two judges dissenting),
that the defendant's motion for judgment be denied, but that he be required
to pay alimony only for the months subsequent to the annulment. Judg-
ment reversed. Sleicher v. Slicher, 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E. 501 (1929).
It is generally said that an annulment renders a marriage void from
the beginning. Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 (1917), L. R.
A. 1918B 415; Matter of Moiwrief, 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550, 27 A.
L. R. 1117 (1923). The application of this doctrine has frequently re:ultei
in harsh decisions. Cf. Matter of Moncrief, supra (statutory lcgitimation
of children upon subsequent intermarriage of parents held inapplicable
where marriage was later annulled); Heinle v. Heinle, 115 Misc. 4419, 188
N. Y. Supp. 399 (Co. Ct. 1921) (wife seeking annulment held not en-
titled to counsel's fees or alimony); 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVOiWc AND
SEPARATION (1891) 608-9. But statutes in most jurisdictions have modified
this rule. Cf. N. H. PUB. LAws (1926) c. 287, §§ 15, 16, 20 (legitimating
and providing for care of children; allowing alimony). In some situa-
tions, also, a few courts have avoided the doctrine's apparent consequences.
Jordan v. Missouri and Kansas Telephone Co., 136 Mo. App. 192, 116 S. W.
432 (1909) (second marriage held not validated by subsequent annulment
of first); McCullen v. McCullen, 162 App. Div. 599, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1069
(1st Dep't 1914) (same). The denial in the instant case of alimony for
the period of the second marriage might have been based upon principles
of estoppel. See Cage v. Acton, 1 Ld. Raym. 515, 521 (1700); 2 BISHOP,
op. cit. supyra §§ 1601, 1603, 1604, 1607. Furthermore, courts will relieve
one from paying alimony to support a woman while she is validly marricd
to and presumably supported by another. Piy v. Phy, 116 Ore. 31, 236
Pac. 751, 240 Pac. 237 (1925), 42 A. L. R. 588 (1926). And the reason of
this rule seems to apply equally to the principal case. But the broader
doctrine, here applied for the first time to the annulment of a marriage,
that the relating back of rescission ab initio "is not. - . without limits pre-
scribed by policy and justice," has advantages beyond the result of the
instant case. It will serve to cover decisions not easily based on estoppel
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or other technique. Cf. Jordan v. Missouri and Kansas Telephone Co.;
MAcCullen v. Mc.ullen, both supra; Note (1915) 1 CORN. L. Q. 117. And
if in application it reaches the result that hereafter the retroactive effect
of an annulment decree shall not be permitted to work inequity as to in-
nocent third parties, it may render remedial legislation unnecessary in
the future.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POWER OF A BOARD OR COMMISSION TO BIND
A MUNICIPALITY FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES.-The plaintiffs were retained by
the board of election commissioners of a city to represent it in a suit
brought to compel the board of supervisors to allow:, in the budget an
amount deemed necessary by the election commissioners. The city attorney
had ruled against the contention of the commissioners and represented the
board of supervisors throughout. The plaintiffs brought an action of
mandamus to compel the city to pay their fees and costs. The defendant's
demurrer was sustained in the lower court. Held, on appeal, that the judg-
ment be affirmed. Glensor, Clewe & Van Dine v. Andriano, Board of
Sup'rs, 278 Pac. 1060 (Cal. 1929).
The power of a corporate city to employ counsel is implied from its
creation and purpose. 3 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed.
1928) § 1275. And there is considerable authority to the effect that ad-
ditional or special counsel may be employed by a city even where the
charter designates particular officers to attend to all its legal affairs,
Boise City v. Randall, 8 Idaho 119, 66 Pac. 938 (1901); Treeman v. City
of Perry, 11 Okla. 66, 65 Pac. 923 (1901). Ordinarily, however, no such
power in an officer, board, or department of a city is implied merely from
the existence or purpose of such a division. Wallace v. Mayor and Common
Council of San Jose, 29 Cal. 180 (1865). Even where a board or com-
mission employs counsel, not in a controversy with another department, and
for a purpose clearly beneficial to the municipality, the courts seem un-
willing to hold the city responsible on the retainer contract. Reynolds v.
Village of Ossining, 102 App. Div. 298, 92 N. Y. Supp. 954 (2d Dep't 1905)
(board of health retained attorney to institute suits against violators of
the board's decrees) ; Miller County Highway and Bridgqe District v. Cook,
134 Ark. 328, 204 S. W. 420 (1918) (attorney retained by improvement
board to institute action testing its own validity). Where the attorney
has been retained in a controversy within or between city departments,
the courts are still less willing to imply a power to bind the city. Hig-
ginson v. City of Fall River, 226 Mass. 423, 115 N. E. 764 (1917)
(fire board seeking to remove chief engineer) ; Finlayson v. Gorman, 117
Mlinn. 323, 136 N. W. 402 (1912) (power and light commission seeking to
compel city treasurer to pay claims incurred by commission). But in
certain exceptional situations such a power has been recognized. Louisville
v. Murphy, 86 Ky. 53 (1887) (counsel retained by mayor to seek injunction
restraining city officials from collecting unauthorized tax) ; Wiley v. Seat-
tle, 7 Wash. 576, 35 Pac. 415 (1894); Barnert v. City of Palerson, 48 N.
J. L. 395 (1886) (counsel retained by mayor to defend mandamus action
brought by city council to require him to sign an illegal bond issue, the
city attorney having declined to act); Smedley v. City of Grand Haven,
125 Mich. 424, 84 N. W. 626 (1900) (counsel retained by mayor to contest
transfer of money from one fund to another by city council contrary to
charter). The courts seem more ready to imply a power to retain counsel
where the purpose of the action is of vital public concern, as distinguished
from the instant case, where the contest over the amount to be allowed
in the budget for the election commissioners partook more of the nature of
a rrere departmental controversy.
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REAL PROPERTY-CONVEYANCE or BASE FEE-INTERPETATION OF "SO
LONG As."-Land was conveyed to the trustees of a church for a small
consideration. The only limiting clause in the deed read "to have and to
hold . . . so long as said lot is held and used for church purposes." A
church was erected upon the land. Subsequently the use for church pur-
poses was abandoned. The trustees petitioned to be allowed to remove
the church. The lower court granted the petition. Held, on writ of error
(one justice dissenting), that the judgment be affirmed, on the ground
that the limiting clause was operative only as a covenant and not as a
limitation upon the grant. Petition of Copps 1L E. Church, 166 N. E. 218
(Ohio 1929).
The instant decision might, in some jurisdictions, have been based upon
the rule that a grant of a fee simple in the granting clause cannot be
cut down by limitations in the habendum only. Carlice v. Ellsbcrry, 82
Ark. 209, 101 S. W. 407 (1907). The court, however, placed it on the
ground that special limitations on a grant of land in fee simple, especially
when relied upon to work a forfeiture, must be created by expre.s terrms
or clear implication. See Columbia Ry. v. South Carolina, 2G1 U. S. 236,
248, 43 Sup. Ct. 306, 309 (1923). Some text writers have even denied
the possibility of rights of reverter after a grant of a determinable fee
as repugnant to the statute Quia Emptores and to the rule against per-
petuities. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITMS (3d ed. 1015) § 32. Ameri-
can courts, however, have gone no further than the rule of construction
applied in the instant case in their opposition to such so-called unreasonable
clouds on title. Vance, Rights of Rererter (1927) 30 Y,*,r L. J. 593;
Powell, Determinable Fees (1923) 23 COL. L. Rcv. 207. Rules of con-
struction apply only in cases of ambiguity, and it is submitted that there
is no ambiguity here. The phrase "so long as," if given any effect, must
create a special limitation; it cannot import a promise. Cf. Snmmit v.
Yount, 109 Ind. 506, 9 N. E. 582 (1886). Similar deeds have been in-
terpreted as creating rights of reverter. Spcrry v. Pond, 5 Ohio 37 (1832)
("so long as . . . and no longer"); Ponzd v. Don glwus, 100 Me. 85, 75 Ati.
320 (1909) (identical with the instant deed). Inasmuch as the con-
sideration paid in the instant case was small the forfeiture would hardly
seem unjust and the limitation might well be enforced. See dis&ent in
instant case at 221.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-LAND HILi SUBJEcT TO rn.L.rTznr-
PowNE OF SCHOOL BOARD TO RETAIN Duu.DiN.Ns.-The plaintiff granted
certain land to a school district, reserving in the deed the right to the
reverter when the land should cease to be used for school purpo.es. The
defendants, trustees of the school district, having changed the site of
the school, attempted to remove the school building which had been built
on IT'e granted land. In an action to enjoin such removal and quiet title
to the entire realty, the lower court gave judgment for the defendant,.
Held, on appeal (one justice dissenting), that the judgment be affirmed.
Schwing v. MlcClure, 166 N. E. 230 (Ohio 1929).
Regardless of the manner in which the question arises, it Wems to br
well settled that a school building, erected on land subject t+') the inntant
type of reverter, passes as part of the realty when the use for Echool
purposes ceases. Fall Creck Towinship v. Shuman, 55 Ind. App. 2=02, 103
N. E. 677 (1913) (action to quiet grantee's title to land and building);
Taylor v. Bird, 150 Ga. 626, 104 S. E. 502 (1920) (removal uf :choulhuuce
enjoined); Malone v. Kitchen, 79 Ind. App. 119, 137 N. E. 562 (1922) (,-ale
of schoolhouse enjoined) ; New Hebron School Ditrict v. Sutt,, 151 Miz+3.
475, 118 So. 303 (1928) (injunction restraining grantor from interfering
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with removal of schoolhouse denied). Moreover, where a statute, allowing
school districts to keep such buildings when the land reverts, went into
effect after such a grant of school land but before the erection of the school-
house, it was held that its application in the case would impair the obliga-
tion of the contract. Board of Education v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S. W.
465 (1917). The instant decision is based on novel grounds. Several
earlier decisions of the lower Ohio courts, holding that a school building
is a trade fixture and may be removed within a reasonable time, are
repudiated. See instant case, supra at 232; cf. May v. Board of Education,
12 Ohio App. 456 (1920). The court argues that, inasmuch as a school
board is prohibited by statute from giving away school property, its ac-
ceptance of a restricted grant is ineffectual to make the building pass
with the realty on reversion since that would be a gift "by indirection."
But if the court considers the reverting itself as a "gift" of the building
to the grantor, it is assuming that the schoolhouse was held in fee simple,
and overlooking the general view that a building of such character becomes
a part of the realty upon its erection, subject to the same contractual
restrictions as the land. See dissent in instant case, supra at 233. The
court gives no satisfactory explanation for its deviation from this general
view.
TAXATION-ESTATE TAX-TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY.-The federal es-
tate tax taxes a transfer of the net estate of every decedent, expressly
including therein any interest held as a tenant by the entirety. [44 STAT.
70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. §§ 1092, 1094 (1926)). Husband and wife owned
property as tenants by the entirety. Upon the death of the husband the
tax on the jointly owned property was paid under protest. In an action
brought by the administrator in the federal district court of Maryland
to recover the amount so paid, the court gave judgment for the plaintiff,
on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional in so far as it in-
cluded estates by the entireties. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be
reversed. United States v. Tyler, 33 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
At common law husband and wife, holding as tenants by the entireties,
were said to be seized of the whole estate at the time of conveyance. 2
Br,. Commu. "182. It is generally true that upon the death of one the sur-
vivor is entitled to the whole estate, which right cannot be defeated by
the other's conveyance to a third person or by an execution against such
other. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 645. The lower court
based its decision on the theory that since under the common law rule,
followed in Maryland, each spouse was already seized of the entire estate,
there was no transfer of interest to the survivor upon the death of one
tenant; the tax was therefore unconstitutional as a direct tax without
apportionment or as a denial of due process. Tyler v. United States, 28
F. (2d) 887 (D. Md. 1928) ; Dime Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Phillips,
30 F. (2d) 395 (M. D. Pa. 1929); (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1156. On similar
reasoning the Circuit Court of Appeals for the third circuit'has recently
reachcd a result contrary to that of the principal cace. United States v.
Prov-hent Trust Co., U. S. Daily, Oct. 15, 1929, at 1950. But as
the instant court points out the survivor is actually benefited, since the in-
terest of the decedent in the property is terminated and the rights of
the survivor are no longer limited by those of the decedent. Similarly,
the value of a dower interest allotted by statute has recently been held
subject to the federal estate tax. Allen, Collector v. Henygelcr, 32 F.
(2d) 69 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). These would seem to be transfers of
economic interests in property which should properly be subject to taxation.
Furthermore, the principal case is in accord with the modern tendency
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to modify the common law doctrine of tenancy by the entiretics. 1
TIFFANY, op. cit. supra 646; cf. Van Ausdall v. Van Ausdall, 48 R. I.
106, 135 Atl. 850 (1927); Wolf v. Johnson, 145 Atl. 363 (Md. 1929). But
cf. Dutcher v. Van Duame, 242 Mich. 477, 219 N. W. 651 (1928); Settle
v. Settle, 8 F. (2d) 911 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1925), 43 A. L. R. 1079 (1926).
TAXATION-EXESiPTION or CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-DEGREE OF OWNRn-
SHIP NEcESSRY.-An individual granted land to a charitable institution
subject to an option to repurchase for $10 on thirty days notice. A deed
reconveying the land to the original grantor was placed in ezcruw subject
to the performance of the option conditions. The grantee institution
covenanted not to transfer the land without the grantor's consent. Ap-
plication for tax exemption was made by the grantee institution under a
statute providing for exemption of property "belonging to" a charitable
institution and used exclusively for charitable purposes. Onio GEN. CODE
(Page, 1926) § 5353. The lower court denied exemption. Held, on appeal
(three justices dissenting), that the judgment be reversed, on the ground
that the land is exempt so long as title remains in the institution and the
charitable use continues. Zangerle v. Gallaghcr, 165 N. E. 709 (Ohio 1929).
Some states have exempted from taxation land used exclusively for
charitable purposes. KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) § 4026; 2 COOLEY, TA:k-
TION (4th ed. 1924) § 744. Others require ownership by the charity in
addition to such use. MiCm. Comp. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1922) § 4001; 2
CooLny, loc. cit. supra. The courts have generally construed such statute3
strictly against exemption. See Siaters of Charity r. Cory, 73 N. J. L.
699, 706, 65 Atl. 500, 503 (1907); Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 634, 635.
But see Salt Lake Lodge v. Groesbeck-, 40 Utah 1, 8, 120 Pac. 192, 194
(1911); 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra, § 673. Thus under a statute requiring
ownership, land was held non-exempt, the title to -which vms in a Catholic
bishop as an individual, unrestricted by any legally enforceable trust for
the benefit of the congregation. Katzcr v. Mii2l'aukce, 104 Wis. 16, 79 N.
W. '745 (1899). The words "belonging to" have been construed a3 not
requiring unrestricted ownership. Borozgh of Princeton r. State Board
of Taxes, 96 N. J. L. 334, 115 Atl. 342 (1921) (school held to "own" land,
although entire purchase price was covered by mortgages). But it seems
that "belonging to" connotes a higher degree of dominion over the land
and more security of occupancy than is found in the principal casce. The
instant decision might permit the holding of land for speculative purposes
free from taxation, by the subterfuge of transferring a title which in
effect creates little more than a tenancy at will.
WORKNMEN'S COMPENSATION-CHILDREN COMMITTED TO STATE INSTITU-
TIONS AS "DEPENDENTS."--A minor child vas committed to an industrial
school as a delinquent, the father not being ordered to contribute toward
his support. Upon the death of the father, the child, by his guardian,
filed an application for compensation under the Workmen's Compcn.ation
Act. He received an award as a partial dependent. Held, on appeal, that
compensation be denied, on the ground that the child was not a "dcpsnd-
ent." Judgment reversed. Advance Ruvilcy Co. v. Freciton', 167 N. E.
377 (Ind. 1929).
Inmates of institutions who are supported solely by the state have been
held not "dependents" under the WVorkmen's Compensation Laws and
not entitled to recover thereunder for the death of thoe normally bound
to support them. Roberts v. Whaley, 192 Mich. 133, 158 N. W. 209 (1916) ;
Eulette v. Zilske, 222 Ill. App. 128 (1921); Rees v. Pcnrikyber Colliery
Co., [1903] 1 K. B. 259. Contra: Kelley v. Hopkin 7, [1908] 2 Ir. R. 84.
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An emancipated child has been held not entitled to compensation for his
father's death, on the ground that the father was under no duty to support
him. Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 106, 128 N. E.
289 (1920). But where an emancipated child resumes his former status,
both the parent's duty and the child's dependency for purposes of compen-
sation revive. Peters v. Industrial Commission, 314 Ill. 560, 145 N. E.
629 (1924). In a few states an absolute decree 'of divorce, giving custody
of a child to the mother without requiring the father to contribute to its
support, is held to terminate the father's responsibility for the child's
maintenance. Husband v. Husband, 67 Ind. 583 (1879); Creeley v. Cree-
ley, 258 Mass. 460, 155 N. E. 424 (1927). And such a child cannot re-
cover compensation for his father's death. Western Indiana Gravel Co. v.
Erwin, 84 Ind. App. 26, 149 N. E. 1:85 (1925) ; Gillander's Case, 243 Mass.
5, 136 N. E. 646 (1922). Most states, however, hold that an absolute
decree of divorce, though the father is not required to contribute to the
support of the child, does not terminate his responsibility to support it.
Walder v. Walder, 159 La. 231, 105 So. 300 (1925); Note (1921) 15 A. L.
R.-569. In these states the child is a "dependent" entitled to compensation.
Panther Creek Mines v. Industrial Commission, 296 Ill. 565, 130 N. E. 321
(1921); Industrial Commission v. Drake, 103 Ohio St. 628, 134 N. E.
465 (1921). The situation of children committed to institutions seems an-
alogous. Statutes usually provide that the parents or guardians of such
children may be called upon by the court to pay all or part of the cost
of the child's maintenance. Guthrie v. Conrad, 133 Iowa 171, 110 N. W.
454 (1907); IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926). § 1705. In the instant case
such contribution by the father was not ordered and this the court re-
garded as a judicial termination of his duty to support the child. It is
submitted that the duty of the father is a continuing one, since under
this statute the court at any time might have required him to contribute
to the child's support and since the child might at any time have been
released.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EMPLOYER'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY TO
MARITIME WORKER THROUGH FOREMAN'S WILLFUL MISCONDUcT.-The plain-
tiff, a stevedore in the employ of the defendant's testator, sought to re-
cover under the Jones Act [41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1926)]
for injuries willfully inflicted by a gang boss in an attempt to speed up
the work of barge loading. Upon a jury finding that the "assault was com-
mitted in the furtherance of the master's work," the trial court allowed
the plaintiff to recover. The Appellate Division concluded that the fellow
servant rule protected the defendant and it reversed the verdict. Encar-
nacion v. Jamivsm, 224 App. Div. 260, 230 N. Y. Supp. 16 (2d Dep't
1928). Held, on appeal, that the judgment of the Appellate Division be
reversed. Encarnacion v. Jamison, 251 N. Y. 218, 167 N. E. 422 (1929).
It is doubtful whether the fellow servant rule was ever applicable to
cases of injuries to seamen caused by negligence. See The. Osceola, 189
U. S. 158, 175, 23 Sup. Ct. 483, 487 (1902). But even if the defense could
have been invoked in admiralty, the Jones Act had the efFect of denying
it any future application. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1926).
The instant court rules broadly that since the Supreme Court in con-
struing the Jones Act has declared "seamen" to include "stevedores." it is
justified in construing "negligence" to include "willful misconduct" of a
brutal foreman "intended and believed to be for the interest of the
master." Cf. International Stevedoring Co. w. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 47
Sup. Ct. 19 (1926). But of. Gabrielson v. Waydell, 135 N. Y. 1, 31 N. E.
969 (1892). The application of the test of what acts of representatives
(Vol. 39
RECENT CASE NOTES
are "intended and believed to be for the interest of the master" has
resulted in confusion. See Richard v,. Amoskeag, 79 N. H. 380, 384, 109
Atl. 88, 91 (1920); Note (1921) 8 A. L. R. 1426. The tendency of recenb
judicial action has been to impose responsibility upon an employer for
the results of willful misconduct on the part of an employee placed in a
position of authority over other employees, irrespective of the motive which
actuates the offending superintendent or foreman. Itlienola, Cotton Oil
Co. v. C 'owly, 121 Miss. 262, 83 So. 409 (1919) (employer held responsible
for manager's assault on accountant where manager attempted to inspect
his personal account); Avondale Mills v. Brtant, 1n Ala. App. 507, 63
So. 932 (1913) (foreman assaulted mill hand as result of matter outside
present employment); DeLeon v. Doyhof, 104 Wash. 337, 176 Pac. 355
(1918) (angry logging superintendent committed assault); Jebeles v.
Booze, 181 Ala. 456, 62 So. 12 (1913) (foreman struck discharged em-
ployee before he could leave the room). Contra: Gabriclson r. Waydell,
supra, (captain in angry mood assaulted seaman under his command);
Petroleum Iron Works v. Bailey, 124 Miss. 11, 86 So. 644 (1921) (foreman
assaulted employee after an argument). Responsibility is generally not
imposed upon an employer where the employee committing the assault
does not occupy a position of authority over the injured employee at the
time of the act. Hines v. Cole, 123 Miss. 254, 85 So. 199 (1920) (both
parties were foremen of equal rank); Smith, v. Seaboard Air Line, 18 Ga.
App. 399, 89 S. E. 490 (1916) (brakeman assaulted conductor after his
discharge); Davis v. Green, 260 U. S. 349, 43 Sup. Ct. 123 (1922) (engineer
killed conductor whom he was expected to obey); Sunderland v. Northern
Express Co., 133 Minn. 158, 157 N. W. 1085 (1916) (express auditor at-
tacked fellow servant not in his charge). The desirability of the instant
holding seems clear, but it appears doubtful whether an insistence that
the foreman's act must be intended to be for the interest of the master
is of much assistance. A foreman assaulting a fellow servant probably
acts from a variety of undefinable motives. Yet the foreman under modern
industrial organization has risen to such a place of importance that he
literally represents the employer to the men. GARxDNEn, PRAcriCAL Fors-
AuNSHIP (1925) 27; TSAD AND MFTCALF, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (1st
ed. 1920) 153-169. Accordingly it would seem better to hold frankly that
an employee does not have to assume the risk of the uncontrolled assaults
of a foreman placed over him and that an employer who puts a servant in
a position of authority over others is responsible when such servant abuses
his power through any lack of discretion or infirmity of temper. See De-
Leon v. Doyhof, sitpra at 342, 343, 176 Pac. ab 350, 357.
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